February 2008
Fri 29 Feb 2008
Fri 29 Feb 2008
For starters, the Yanks don’t have the term “negative equity”. I tried to tell them by commenting on this CNN story, but it seems CNN is another site where they get you to write a comment and nothing happens. I won’t bother in future.
But this NYT story is breath-taking. It seems the US is the land of the free, yes sirree, you’re free to walk away from your mortgage if it turns “upside-down”! Unbelievable. I hope they realise that no-one (stupid foreigners) is ever going to lend them (the US) money to buy houses ever again. And they’ll probably be very careful what else they lend it for. Talk about moral hazard, eh, Merv?

Fri 29 Feb 2008
There was an excellent Cambridge Energy Forum (CEF) meeting on aviation yesterday. As someone said there, it’s astonishing that flying is now a sin. Is this really justified? Do we all have to stop flying? How can we reduce carbon emissions from flying?
It turns out that some work is already taking place to develop (small) aircraft powered by electricity. This could be scaled up, or a development path via hybrids to minimal reliance on liquid fuels.
I drafted the rest of this post in response to an email before the meeting, but nothing was said there that changes my mind - I’m now just somewhat better informed!
I intend to address the thorny issue of aviation in the book I’m (slowly) writing. I don’t agree exactly that the aviation industry should create technologies such as CCS (companies, in my view, should do what they do best), but it should certainly pay for them.
There is a clear economic problem to be overcome if the goal is to reduce carbon emissions from flying. If you just put a price on carbon, or on fossil fuels for that matter, then you introduce disincentives for different activities disproportionately, because, (among other reasons) fuel costs are a different proportion of the total cost of different products and services.
Consumers would still quite happily fly at a carbon cost of $100s per tonne [as was pointed out at a recent CEF talk, if I recollect correctly], but at such levels people would be switching away rapidly from other uses of carbon fuels, e.g. road transport, power generation. Incentives for suppliers to introduce technological changes depend on (inter alia) (a) competition from substitute products - for long-haul flights this will only become significant at a very high price for carbon (for business travellers, the cost would surely have to be $1000s/tonne) and (b) the availability of alternative technologies and the cost to introduce them. It is politically impossible to go straight to a carbon cost of $100s. Therefore, if we simply put a (gradually increasing) price on carbon, the aviation industry will continue to grow for some decades. George Monbiot reaches a similar conclusion, I believe, just by considering possible alternative technologies (an incomplete argument). If the policy agenda is to simply impose a flat cost on carbon emissions, then, by 2050 (say), the global economy will be hugely dependent on an unsustainable mode of transport, making it difficult to achieve further emission reductions.
So we have two distinct reasons for taxing aviation emissions more than other emissions:
(1) the additional Radiative Forcing of aviation emissions (because they take place at altitude);
(2) the need (because of the urgency of the GW problem) to encourage technological innovation in aviation and the development of substitute products (high speed rail, etc.) in parallel with, rather than after, other technological changes (such as the decarbonisation of power-generation and road/rail transport).
It seems to me that it is therefore a no-brainer to impose additional costs on aviation emissions beyond a carbon cost proportional to emissions. It seems logical to use these to pay for CCS, the idea being that once we reach the point where we can afford zero net anthropogenic GHG emissions, the aviation industry will have to pay to capture a multiple (based on the scientific assesssment of the damage of high-altitude aviation emissions) of its GHG emissions (though such an equation would not be climate neutral). Obviously the carbon sequestered shouldn’t come ultimately come from fossil-fuel burning, that would be double-counting, i.e. aviation has to pay for both extracting carbon (and/or other GHGs) from the atmosphere and sequestering or destroying these GHGs.
I wouldn’t completely write off the possibility of decarbonising aviation, though. There are certainly a lot of efficiency savings that could be made (I guess we’ll hear about some of these later today), but, apparently, experimental entirely solar-powered aircraft have been built. My idea (OK, just a thought-experiment to support my argument for the possibility of zero carbon aviation) is to increase the energy available to aircraft by putting up a few (thousand) satellites with computer-controlled solar reflector arrays (any old orbit will do, computers will be able to deal with the problem). Solar-powered aircraft would book slots for satellites to focus light on them (note the word “focus” - nothing below or above the aircraft need get fried). Just an idea, but maybe it could reduce emissions at altitude, which is where you want to get rid of them. (There is also a multiplier effect to be exploited, since, with an external energy source, an aircraft could fly higher for a given onboard fuel to payload weight ratio, reducing air resistance. Also, we should be able to focus a lot of light on solar panels on top of an aircraft, since the surface would be air-cooled). At the airport, an alternative way of using external power would be to accelerate aircraft using electricity (why stop at towing them to a stationary stop at the start of the runway?), e.g. maglev ought to be able to get you to take-off speed. Obtaining power this way during landing could be tricky, though, but maybe after the recent incident at Heathrow, it might be a good idea to develop non-powered landing techniques purely involving drag and braking, anyway! I’m a bit surprised, really, that carbon-fuel free flying isn’t one of the 14 great engineering challenges: http://www.networkworld.com/community/node/25219
Campaigning to prevent runway development is not the way forward, IMHO, since:
(1) It’ll simply displace economic activity that causes flying, i.e by the Displacement Fallacy, the available fuel will simply be used in China, India, Africa… rather than UK.
(2) It may have unintended consequences and reduce opportunities for efficiency savings.
(3) It second-guesses where technological breakthroughs will occur - i.e. what if we manage to decarbonise flying before, say, shipping, and are left without enough airport capacity?
(4) It pisses people off, motivating political opposition (and I’m sure there will always be people who want to do less about GW than others).
My alternative proposal would be to turn airports into more general transport interchanges, adding high-speed rail connections to take advantage of the existing local transport infrastructure that currently only supports air-travellers. This would encourage people to switch transport modes, perhaps initially for part or one leg of a journey. Btw I worked out recently that you could save around 10%, on average, of total journey carbon emissions if you simply got people to take the train rather than drive to Stansted. But I bet you FoE et al would object that improving rail services from, for example, Cambridge to Stansted would “encourage people to fly”. But I’m starting to digress…
It seems to me that a practical first-step would be for (say) the EU and US to get airlines to fund CCS trials, either via a levy/tax or through a voluntary agreement with the industry. We need to know a lot more about the viability and likely costs of CCS, ASAP. There are huge policy implications if the potential of CCS has been overblown (or understated, but that’s never happened before in the whole of human history for a technology at this stage in its development!).

Fri 29 Feb 2008
Today is the day when thousands of you girls get down on one knee and ask your boyfriend to make her the happiest woman alive! (dream on, Mark!)
But there’s another unique and interesting feature of the 29th Feb. Every four years, bosses up and down the land get an extra day of labour from their employees “for free”!
It’s a shame we at Project Dirt have only just heard about this initiative (or we would have promoted it earlier), but the National Trust have dedicated today to the “Great Green Leap Day” initiative, and giving their staff the day off to pursue environmental activities. And the Times newspaper’s Eco-Worrier has several good suggestions as to what to get up to!
This initiative appears to have drummed up support from a number of camps… Brendan Barber, General Secretary of the TUC, said: “Giving employees an extra day off work while encouraging them to think about what they can do to go greener sounds like a great idea. More employers should be thinking about how to give their staff a better work-life balance. It is time for the Government to take a leaf out of the National Trust book and create a new community day bank holiday.”

So, thinking forward… let’s lobby the government to create this as a special “green” bank holiday. We’ve got four years until the next one… and that will be in London’s Olympic Year (2012). As it ties in with the environmental goals of the Olympic movement, we should definitely be thinking about lobbying hard for this to be a national day off.
Nick
Wed 27 Feb 2008
This is positively my last post on Northern Rock.
I’ve recently taken to listening to Radio 4 in the mornings. As a communication medium TV has much greater bandwidth than radio (visual awa aural), so why do they fill it with garbage?
Anyway, yesterday we had the former Treasurer of the Rock, who noted passim that “a £5bn problem” was turned into a £25bn one by the bungling authorities. Would have been nice if he’d broken cover before nationalisation. Still, it’s more than his successor has done - he’s quietly left the bank. Not surprisingly, since basically liquidity is a Treasury issue and I presume it’s the Treasurer’s job to stand up to a Chief Exec who gets carried away.
Today we had Hector Sants of the FSA, who explained how it would all not have happened had they paid a little more attention to NR. What self-serving twaddle! Any system that relies on a single group of experts (a) seeing something that’s going on that no-one else (auditors, the markets) can, and (b) being able to quietly solve the problem behind closed doors, will always fail. No, the Tripartite Authorities need to concentrate on setting objective liquidity (and other) measures for the banks, that can be policed not just be the FSA, but by the market and the banks’ own internal and external auditors. Because liquidity is a collective property, the behaviour of the BoE also needs to be predictable - i.e. to inject liquidity into the markets if particular thresholds are crossed. The 19th century approach Sants and King would like (I wonder why) is no longer appropriate. We need “water” - transparent liquidity - management. Planet Hector must resemble Mars.
After the Guardian rejected my exceedingly witty letter, I thought of writing a piece for their “Reply” column. Trouble is, the issue will now have to be resolved in court, so bashing my head against a Rock trying to change a few minds can no longer have any real world effect, so I left it unfinished. Here’s my draft, anyway:
“Public support for the nationalisation of Northern Rock is based on a misunderstanding. The false impression has been given that nationalisation is the least risky option for the taxpayer. In fact, two private sector proposals were rejected last weekend because the Government judged the potential to be too low for profit to accrue to the public purse.
The shareholders’ preferred option was that of the in‑house management team, led by Paul Thompson. This proposal included a rights issue of £700m. The shareholders would have invested another £700m in the bank. This will not now happen. By nationalising the bank, the taxpayer is therefore taking more risk than necessary. As a Northern Rock shareholder, I am baffled that the Government has spurned my offer to take on this risk, and distressed to be vilified in the Guardian and other media.
Northern Rock would have been managed similarly whether nationalised or not. Bryan Sanderson has said that he will operate “at arm’s length” from the Treasury. Even if it had not nationalised the bank, the Government could have imposed constraints on the payment of dividends and the extent to which Northern Rock could take on new business.
It’s perhaps worth remembering that among the people who will suffer most as a result of this fiasco are financially stretched Northern Rock mortgage-holders. The essence of the situation is that Northern Rock is simply an institution established to intermediate between those prepared to lend money and those who wish to borrow it. Following the run on the bank, Northern Rock now has a lot less money to lend. Something has to give. It seems that the nationalised bank intends to try to drive mortgage business away at the end of existing fixed-rate periods. But some mortgage-holders will be unable to find another lender, because every bank has reduced the maximum loan-to-value ratio it is prepared to offer, and, in any case, house prices are starting to fall. The most vulnerable homeowners will be forced to remain on expensive variable rate mortgages with Northern Rock. As a shareholder right up until nationalisation, it’s difficult to reconcile the moral opprobrium heaped on myself with the fact of the matter that borrowers were let down by depositors. Hadn’t they seen “It’s a Wonderful Life?”.
Under the Thompson proposal shareholders would have put another £700m in Northern Rock. It is completely untrue that the taxpayer would have been “retaining all the risks”, as claimed by, among others, Vince Cable, on this week’s BBC Question Time. Let’s imagine that there is indeed a serious house-price crash in the UK, and, in a couple of years it becomes clear that Northern Rock is insolvent. If the bank had remained private, the shareholders would have lost everything, including the £700m of fresh capital. In the same scenario under nationalisation, the taxpayer will have to cover all the costs. The taxpayer will be at least £700m worse off under nationalisation than with the private sector solution. It’s a shame that so much energy has gone into pouring vitriol onto shareholders, and so little time spent understanding their role. I’m no happier with the state of Northern Rock than any other taxpayer, but, unlike most, I would have been prepared to invest more money in the bank with the risk of losing it all. Now, every taxpayer is having to take on that risk.
Two typical comments have caught my eye this week. Will Hutton referred (in a Comment piece in the FT) to the “Northern Rock shareholders’ extraordinary sense of entitlement”. And someone left a message instead of their name on a petition on the Downing Street website: “ffs shareholders should know the risks - u deserve nothing”. But during the run on the bank, the government guarantee to depositors was dramatically improved, at great risk to the taxpayer. No‑one said: “ffs depositors should know the risks”. Perhaps that’s why shareholders expect to be treated a little more fairly than they have been.
The nationalisation route has been taken for purely political reasons, and is certainly not the least risky option for the taxpayer. From a shareholder point of view it is laughable for the Government to tell shareholders such as myself that we’ll be treated as if the bank is being wound up, when in fact it is being run as a going concern. Naturally, if the Government does find an “independent” arbiter willing to accept the terms of reference it is proposing, I’ll join with other Northern Rock shareholders in taking legal action, as long as I consider it likely that a judge will see the situation my way. Otherwise, I’ll have to shrug and walk away. The Northern Rock shareholder could have had such a beautiful relationship with the taxpayer. Now I guess we both feel as if we’ve just been screwed.”
That’s it, there are other fish to fry. See you in court, Darling.

Mon 25 Feb 2008
I’m using BS to stand for Building Society, and b.s. for a more vernacular phrase!
One amusing cameo during the Northern Rock debacle was by the ONS, which ruled that the Bank of England loan and guarantees to the Rock should be counted as part of the national debt. Yet the national debt does not include the guarantee on all bank and BS deposits (up to £35K). This comes to much more, several hundred billion is my guesstimate. Is the taxpayer safe?
A few days ago, I received an annual statement from what I shall term, to protect the innocent, Piggy BS. As far as I know, Piggy is a typical BS. What with all this Northern Rock business, though, I thought I’d have a quick look, rather than filing the leaflet in the wpb immediately. And it makes surprisingly interesting reading.
Piggy helpfully provided some ratios:
- the liquid assets ratio is a whopping 25%, that is, it could meet investor withdrawals of a third of the size of the mortgage book! Impressive.
- its gross capital ratio is 6.2%. That is, shareholders capital is 6.2% of shares (i.e. account balances) and borrowings, and obviously about 8% of mortgages (since the liquid assets ratio is 25%).
8% doesn’t seem a lot to me (though I’m not claiming great expertise, merely trying to make some simple points), since this sort of capital ratio is considered appropriate for diversified banks. And Piggy only invests in one thing. “Huff, puff”, says the big bad wolf!
Anyway, if 16% (by value) of Piggy’s mortgagees hand in the keys, and it can recover only 50% of its loan on each property, it would be pork pie time.
Looking a little closer, it gets a little worse than this, since some of Piggy’s capital (OK, only about about 5%) is a “revaluation reserve” on - yes , you’ve guessed it - property, i.e. its own offices. Since it’s a reasonable guess that the market value of this property will be correlated with the property Piggy has kindly mortgaged, this reserve might go negative (from +5% to -5%) over the same period as its mortgage book deteriorates. So let’s say we only need 14% of our customers to default.
Still, not a very likely scenario even though Piggy has increased its mortgage book over the last year by about £1.5bn - three times reserves and more than twice total shareholders’ capital - implying that a lot of the mortgage book - maybe a third of the £10bn total - is recent lending and therefore vulnerable to a house price crash. But more than 1% defaults in a year would be extreme - in fact, catastrophic, since “impairment losses” are currently running at less than 0.02% of the mortgage book - so even a decade long housing bear market should be sustainable.*
Bricks not straw so far.
But Piggy also provides a couple of other ratios:
- annual profit is 0.37% of total assets (i.e. of about £10bn mortgages + £3bn liquid assets);
- management expenses are 0.56% of total assets. Seems a lot. If mortgages average £100K, management of each costs about £700/year!
Looking at it this way, it’s not quite so rosy. Defaults of 1% (by value) or more of the mortgage book would wipe out profits for a given year. A few years of this, and we would start to lose shareholder value.
It’s worse than this, though, since the fees on modern mortgages are front-loaded, i.e. they’re arrangement fees and so forth. So, profits will deteriorate even if there’s a downturn in activity.
And we’d all start to worry long before Piggy goes bust. I suspect Piggy would have to find a Miss Piggy to merge with if, over a period of time, its reserves halved (say) from current levels. If there is a housing market crash expect some action in a few years time.
It’s not Piggy we should really be worried about, though. No, Darling’s generosity on our behalf suggests it’s systemic problems we should be worried about. I’ve already mentioned how BS balance sheets could deteriorate if 25 year mortgages become faddish (remember endowment mortgages) and interest rates rise significantly. Of course, if all this is accompanied by a recession, falling house-prices and increasing delinquency rates (though long-term mortgages do militate against this, somewhat) the BSs would face a double whammy.
But what really gets me is that the BSs have no apparent means of rebuilding their balance sheets. They can’t ask their shareholders for more money, like the banks can. The Government would ultimately have to pick up the enormous tab. We only need the mother of all housing crashes once and the BSs are all toast, (or bacon). I just don’t see how they could sustain losses year after year indefinitely. And some markets do drop 70% or more. There’s absolutely no reason why this can’t happen to the housing market in the UK. And, as I said before, it has happened in the US.
As I say, though, I’m not claiming to be an expert. This could all be b.s. You decide. Me, I’ll look at Piggy’s next annual statement even more carefully.
* Postscript (1): Maybe a long bear market would not be quite so survivable after all. I now read in the FT that “1.1 per cent of mortgage borrowers were in arrears at the end of 2007″. Crikey! This can’t be right, can it?
Postscript (2): And the default rates in some parts of the US are quite hair-raising (AP via Yahoo):
“During the past year, 30 states saw an increase in the number of homes that had received at least one filing. Nevada led the nation, with 6,087 properties receiving at least one filing, up 95 percent from a year earlier but down 45 percent from December, the firm said. That translates to a rate of about one foreclosure for every 167 households.” [My emphasis.]

Mon 25 Feb 2008
…for micro-generation of solar power, geddit? Here comes the sun… oh, forget it!
Is the Guardian trying to piss me off deliberately? Not content with trying to convince me that it makes good sense for the taxpayer to pay a premium rate to savers, they’ve started a dawn chorus (which occurs as we start to be warmed by solar power every morning - oh, never mind!) in praise of feed-in tariffs.
I remember that for reasons I can’t quite recollect I became much vexed about this a little while ago. Searching my hard drive, I find I actually went so far as to write to a letter to the Guardian editor on the matter. They didn’t publish it, so I will:
“Your Leader “Windy words” (December 11) supports David Cameron’s suggestion that using “feed-in tariffs” to encourage micro-generation of electricity would be the best way for the UK to boost its production of renewable energy (Tories see 1m households selling electricity back to the suppliers, December 6). In fact, feed-in tariffs for micro-generators would be an extremely expensive way to increase renewable energy production.
The most popular micro-generation technology would probably be roof‑top photovoltaic solar panels, since it now seems that domestic wind-turbines have the slight drawback of generating only miniscule amounts of electricity.
But feed-in tariffs for solar panels would be an inequitable subsidy, since, if they are to succeed in stimulating investment, the rate paid to micro-generators per unit of electricity would have to be several times the retail electricity price, as it is in Germany. The result would be to increase everyone’s electricity bill in order to provide a guaranteed income to those with large roofs and the financial resources to invest in solar panels, a demographic one might term “the Camerons”.
There is certainly a case for obliging suppliers to buy micro-generated electricity at or just below the retail price, as this would force them to overcome the barriers of organisational cultures and legacy infrastructure geared to purchasing from a small number of large-scale power generators. But forcing them to pay far more for micro-generated electricity than they can sell it for, for many years, through guaranteed feed-in tariffs, in order to make expensive micro-generation technologies financially viable for wealthy home-owners, would not only distort the market but also lock us all into paying a higher price than necessary for all our electricity, including that from other renewable sources. Since electricity carries no information about its source, there would also be considerable scope for fraud, especially if electricity prices fall in the future.
Yvette Cooper outlined (Letters, December 7) how the Government intends to use the planning process, rather than feed-in tariffs, to encourage micro-generation of electricity. This has the advantage of merely raising housing costs for everyone, rather than forcing the poor to subsidise the rich. But if the “zero-carbon” homes to be built from 2016 do still require electricity, albeit less than existing houses, why pay more to generate it locally just for the sake of it? Given the huge costs involved, we will ultimately be compelled to generate renewable energy in the most efficient way possible. This is much more likely to be by building offshore wind turbines than by paying David Cameron to put solar panels on his roof. Pretending otherwise makes it even more difficult to reduce our carbon emissions.
In contrast with David Cameron’s and Yvette Cooper’s expensive initiatives to encourage local power generation, the existing Renewables Obligation provides an effective incentive for electricity suppliers to provide us with an increasing proportion of renewable energy in the most cost-effective way.”
Let the poor subsidise the rich!
I should note that ideally the Renewables Obligation (RO) would be technologically blind, so that old ladies trying to stave off hypothermia invest their pennies in the most cost-effective renewable energy at any given point in time. In fact, though, some technologies are more equal than others under the RO.
Pleased to find it’s not just me - once again another Tim agrees.

Mon 25 Feb 2008
There are voices of sanity out there. Tim Congdon has written several sensible pieces on the Rock affair in the FT. He points out in the latest that the ECB has bailed out the Spanish banks in a way the BoE refused to do for NR. I’m a little surprised, though, that he doesn’t mention that at least one Spanish bank - Santander, which owns Abbey - directly competes in the mortgage market with UK banks. They - and all other European and US banks who might want to operate in the UK retail market, perhaps by snapping up A&L, B&B or even NR itself - have now been put at a significant competitive advantage. Knowing how the ECB will behave in a liquidity crisis, they now know they need to maintain less liquidity than their UK peers and can therefore use their capital more efficiently.
But, from a BoE view, of course, the NR cock-up has been self-defeating. No major bank operating in the UK market will ever allow itself to be totally reliant on the BoE again. They’ll make sure they can also draw on funds from the ECB, the Fed and/or other central banks. Presumably they need to retain a relationship with the BoE if they want to offer banking services in the UK, but they will rely on this as little as possible. The BoE will become marginalised. Hmm, maybe I’ll see the day when I buy my UK daily paper with euros.
Unless, of course, the BoE lets everyone know that it has learnt lessons from the liquidity crisis, and will take specific actions - working in concert with other central banks as central banks should, or they’re not really central, are they? . Scapegoating Northern Rock makes it more, not less difficult to calmly identify what mistakes were made by who, and what policy adjustments should be made by whom. And, of course, so does reappointing Mervyn King. Perhaps we should start calling the BoE the UK’s peripheral bank.
Postscript (1) : An article in the Telegraph this morning shows exactly how small UK banks (and building societies) are being penalised by having to use a back-door (larger UK banks with a direct relationship with the ECB) to access liquidity in the euro which is unavailable in sterling. Of course, the British consumer will ultimately pay for this. The Telegraph reports that: “Bankers said the fact that UK lenders were having to access the ECB through the back door exposed failures at the Bank of England.” Quite.
Postscript (2): And the Guardian notes that “… mortgage experts are trying to predict the winners from the credit crunch and concluding that Abbey could come out on top because of the funding available to its Spanish parent, Santander, through the European Central Bank.” Surprise, surprise.

Fri 22 Feb 2008
Who’s paying the real cost of supermarket price wars? That’s the question Action Aid want us to consider. We’re fully behind their ‘Who Pays?’ campaign, not least because our resident techy, Doug “did I tell you I’m getting married?” Fusebox, helped to make their website. And whilst it’s not a purely environmental agenda, it rings true with one of our key messages… think before you buy!
Watch his funny video and sign the petition here!
Every week 32 million of us shop in British supermarkets; in fact three-quarters of the food we buy is purchased in supermarkets. But as supermarkets continue to push for lower prices and higher profits – who is paying the cost? More often than not, it’s the suppliers. The Competition Commission, an independent body currently investigating supermarket behaviour, found that supermarkets are abusing their buying power when they trade with suppliers, and suggested there is a possible need for a regulator to enforce the Supermarkets’ Code of Practice.
Action Aid’s campaign urges everyone to take action as a consumer and a citizen to make the government bring in new rules to ensure that supermarkets do not abuse their dominant position. That way, supermarket shoppers can have confidence that all the goods they buy have been traded in an ethical way. And that has to be good for the environment as well as for suppliers.
Nick
Thu 21 Feb 2008
Tropical cyclone history - part II: Paleotempestology still in its infancy
By group, under SyndicatedLeave a Comment
Guest Commentary from Urs Neu
While analyzing tropical cyclone records is difficult enough (see 'Tropical cylone history - part I'), it is even more challenging to reliably estimate hurricane activity back in time. Recently, Nature published an attempt to reconstruct past major hurricane activity back to 1730 (Nyberg et al. 2007). The authors concluded that the phase of enhanced hurricane activity since 1995 is not unusual compared to other periods of high hurricane activity in the record and thus appears to represent a recovery to normal hurricane activity. The paper was advertised in a press release put out by Nature and received broad media attention.
Although the approach outlined by the authors is interesting, the study contains in my view a number of problems, as outlined in a comment published in Nature today (Neu 2008):
The authors use a couple of coral records and a marine sediment core from the Caribbean to reconstruct first wind shear and then major hurricane activity in the tropical Atlantic. First they find a good correlation of their proxy records to wind shear measurements in the mean hurricane development region (MDR). There are two interesting features here: the coral proxies show a negative correlation to wind shear over the MDR, but a positive correlation north of it. Thus, in relation to hurricane activity there is an opposite effect of wind shear in different regions (Fig. 2 of Nyberg et al.). We’ll come back to that later. The sediment proxy shows a positive correlation to wind shear over the MDR and no correlation north of it. Thus, since the two proxy records are correlated to wind shear in the opposite direction, one would expect that the proxies show opposite patterns and trends. This is more or less true for the period 1950-1990 used to calibrate (or ‘train’) the statistical model. However, for the preceding 230 years, the long-term trend is the same for both proxies. This clearly indicates, that at least one of the proxies has a wrong long-term trend, because they show an opposite long-term trend of wind shear. Thus the long-term trend of a reconstruction using both proxies does not seem very reliable. Nyberg et al. did not comment on this basic problem in their reply (Nyberg et al. 2008).
For the reconstruction of past major hurricane activity they use these two proxies again together with a proxy for SSTs. Besides the problem of two proxies with opposite long-term trend, the coral proxy has, as mentioned, an opposite correlation to wind shear within and outside the MDR. Since 1944 about 50% of major Atlantic hurricanes have reached major hurricane strength only outside the area of positive correlation (in the area north of 20ºN between 50 to 75ºW and north of 25ºN outside this section), i.e. in an area with no or an inverse correlation to the proxies. Since wind shear seems to be high in this area at times when it is low in the MDR, the relation of major Atlantic hurricane frequency to the coral proxy does not seem so evident from physical considerations. Moreover, the fraction of major hurricanes observed outside the MDR varies with time (Figure 1) and might have changed over the last decade, which further complicates the relationship.
Figure 1. Major hurricanes outside the MDR. The annual number of major hurricane tracks where major hurricane status is only reached north of 25ºN or north of 20ºN between 50-75ºW (red line) and the total annual number of major hurricanes in the Atlantic (blue line), shown both as 5-year-running mean. Data is from the NOAA National Hurricane Center best track data set (HURDAT).
Although the correlation patterns presented by Nyberg et al. suggest a good correlation of their Caribbean proxies to wind shear over a large part of the Northern tropical Atlantic, this does not mean automatically that the correlation of the proxies to total Atlantic major hurricane activity is representative for the whole Atlantic as well. Firstly, hurricane activity is influenced by other factors than wind shear (which might vary over different areas), and secondly the effect of wind shear evidently is opposite in different regions.
There is a correlation of the proxies to major Atlantic hurricane activity over the period 1946-1995, however, the large activity increase already starts more than 5 years earlier in the proxies than in the hurricane record. The authors explain this time lag by the El Niño in the early 1990ies, however, since the influence of El Niño partly works over wind shear, this influence should be already included in the proxies.
Neither the reconstruction nor the calibration period covers the strong increase in major hurricane activity in the 1990ies, but it is obvious from observed wind shear, and recognized by the authors, that this increase cannot be explained by wind shear and is probably due to the increase in SSTs as several studies have pointed out (e.g. Hoyos et al. 2006). Since the training period of their reconstruction model covers a phase, where the main variation of hurricane activity seems to be mostly through wind-shear (1946-1990), but not the following phase, where SST changes are the most important factor, the model probably does not represent the influence of SSTs very well.
Now we come back to the question of the reliability of the hurricane record. One of the big problems of the Nyberg et al. reconstruction is, that it is far off the hurricane record before 1944 (Figure 3 in Nyberg et al). For the period 1850-1944, the reconstruction shows more than 3 (about 3.3) major hurricanes per year on average, while the hurricane record has less than 1.5 per year. Nyberg et al (2007) explain this discrepancy by the unreliability of the hurricane record. This explanation seems too simple. There are, as discussed above, uncertainties in the hurricane record. These are, however, not infinitely large. I have tried to estimate an upper error bar for major hurricane activity. Since there are no estimations of underreporting biases of major hurricanes, I assumed a constant proportion of major hurricanes to total tropical storm number. As Holland and Webster (2007) have shown, this proportion has some multidecadal variation, but these variations are not very large on the 50 year time scale, and there seems to be no significant long-term trend. I used the highest reporting bias estimations of tropical storms by Landsea (2004, 2007) - which are probably too high, as discussed in 'Tropical cyclone history - Part I', i.e. 1851-1885 plus 3 tropical storms per year on average; 1885-1965 plus 2; 2003-2006 minus 1; see Figure 2, black line).
Figure 2. Major hurricanes compared to the total number of tropical storms. The red line shows the 5-year moving average of the ratio between major hurricanes and the total number of tropical storms calculated from the best track data of the NOAA National Hurricane Center (HURDAT). The black line shows the ratio after correction of the observational bias proposed by Landsea et al. The green line shows the ratio after correction for a possible observational bias of major hurricanes before 1910.
Nyberg et al. claim that Landsea suggests 0-6 additional storms per year before 1885 and 0-4 per year before 1900 and thus the ‘upper limit’ correction should be 6 and 4 storms, respectively. However, the range given by Landsea represents the annual variation of the bias, not an uncertainty range of the average (I very much doubt that Landsea thinks a zero correction on average to be possible).
The average ratio from 1910 to 1965, i.e. before the satellite area, is the same as after 1965 (21%). Thus there is no evidence to assume a significant underestimation of major hurricanes. However, for the period before 1910 a correction of plus 1 major hurricane per year is needed to attain a similar mean ratio (21% major hurricanes) as in the satellite period (Fig. 2, green line). The adjusted record has a mean of just 2 major hurricanes per year between 1851 and 1940. Thus even if taking into account a high observation bias, the Nyberg et al (2007) reconstruction overestimates major hurricane frequency before 1940 by at least 50%. Observation uncertainties therefore do not explain the mismatch of reconstruction and observation as supposed by the authors.
Even if using an extreme correction of plus 5 TCs before 1900, the corrected record does not overlap the error bars given by Nyberg et al (2007). Or, looking the other way round, to get major hurricane frequency as shown by the reconstruction, the observational bias prior to 1900 would have to be in the order of 10 tropical storms per year on average, which is not very likely.
In summary, there are serious doubts about the representativeness of the proxies used by Nyberg et al., and there is a clear mismatch of reconstruction and earlier observation. Therefore the conclusions drawn in that paper are on very weak ground.
Well, what can we conclude from the discussion: Paleo-tempestology is a brand new field of study and there is undoubtedly a long way to go before the reconstruction of extreme events (like hurricanes) in the past will be anything more than suggestive. However, there's a lot more data out there waiting to be collected and analysed.
References:
Holland, G.J., and P.J. Webster (2007): Heightened tropical cyclone activity in the North Atlantic: natural variability or climate trend? Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Ser. A, 365, 2695– 2716, doi:10.1098/rsta.2007.2083.
Hoyos, C.D., P.A. Agudelo, P.J. Webster, & J.A. Curry (2006). Deconvolution of the Factors Contributing to the Increase in Global Hurricane Intensity. Science, 312, 94-97.
Landsea, C. W. (2007), Counting Atlantic Tropical Cyclones Back to 1900. EOS, 18, 197-208.
Landsea, C. W., C. Anderson, N. Charles, G. Clark, J. Dunion, J. Fernandez-Partagas, P. Hungerford, C. Neumann, and M. Zimmer (2004), The Atlantic hurricane database re-analysis project: Documentation for the 1851–1910 alterations and additions to the HURDAT database, in Hurricanes and Typhoons: Past, Present and Future, edited by R. J. Murname and K.-B. Liu, pp. 177–221, Columbia Univ. Press, New York.
Neu, U. (2008): Is recent hurricane activity normal? Nature, 451, E5 (21 February 2008)
Nyberg, J., B.A. Malmgren, A. Winter, M.R. Jury, K.H. Kilbourne & T.M. Quinn (2007): Low Atlantic hurricane activity in the 1970s and 1980s compared to the past 270 years. Nature, 447, 698-701.
Nyberg, J., B.A. Malmgren, A. Winter, M.R. Jury, K.H. Kilbourne & T.M. Quinn (2008): Reply to ‘Is recent hurricane activity normal?’ Nature, 451, E6 (21 February 2008)
Wed 20 Feb 2008
Don’t worry, the point of the title will be revealed!
It’s amazing how emotion so often overrules reason. This is how we’ve made the biofuel blunder. Mark Lynas, bless his organic cotton socks, gloats that “the environmentalists” were right about biofuels. That’s really funny, Mark, because I thought the problem was that too many “environmentalists” thought biofuels were a good idea. Their emotions gave them the wrong answer. The greens aren’t really green. My emotions - including a visceral horror at the idea of destroying nature to fuel cars - and presumably yours, are supported by reason.
But when we come to a case like the Northern Rock affair, reason barely has a chance. Because the reds aren’t really red. They don’t believe in fairness. No, much more important to them is the comforting illusion that “the people” are in control (we’ll just blip over the last 80 years of European history, shall we?). So my breakfast is tainted with bile as I read from Volks Comrade Hutton that:
“The free-market fundamentalist proposition that the market is the spontaneous natural condition and any form of public interaction is therefore unnatural – which feeds Northern Rock shareholders’ extraordinary sense of entitlement – is to misdescribe reality.”
And there’s me and Rousseau thinking the state was a necessary evil! Thanks for putting us right, Will! I’m a bit confused though: why isn’t “the market” a “form of public interaction”?
But what I really object to in Hutton’s piece is the throwaway: “Northern Rock shareholders’ extraordinary sense of entitlement”. Here Hutton reveals his true colours. It’s not about fairness at all. He wants to create a public space where he can project his emotions. A dictatorship of the commentariat, perhaps. No, if by “red” we mean greater equality, the reds aren’t red. They just want to return to the ways of organising things that led to rivers of blood in the 20th century. Maybe it’s in that sense that they are “red”.
The problem with the Northern Rock affair is that the State has become involved far too deeply. Brown and Darling (while Mervyn King sits back and breathes a sigh of relief) have been able to use public indignation at the “taxpayer” taking risks over NR to create a smokescreen around the UK’s mishandling of the liquidity crisis - which might otherwise have had the dire consequence of loss of public support for, shock, horror, the independence of sterling itself - and at the same time expropriate for the State assets that are possibly worth several billions. Nationalising Northern Rock is less about the economic needs of the British people (who will be worse off as a result of this sorry little affair because people will be less willing in future to take the risk of lending money to them, with the result that the capital they need to borrow to buy their homes will cost them more), it’s more about their emotional needs. The NR shareholders have become (inappropriate) scapegoats for those bad feelings about excesses in the City. Rather than create a fairer society (by, for example, raising the minimum wage) we’ll all try to feel a little bit better, shall we?
Maybe reason can get us a little further. Let’s try to analyse the situation. Here’s what Larry Elliott wrote in yesterday’s Guardian:
“The bank has a good mortgage book and, given the tendency of house prices in Britain to rise, there is no reason why the taxpayer should lose out. … Once ministers decided against administration, nationalisation was always preferable to a lopsided public-private option that, as illustrated by the £2bn Metronet bail-out, would have meant nationalising the risk and privatising the profits.”
A poor analogy as NR is not being nationalised because it has negative net assets. It’s being nationalised because… um, why exactly is it being nationalised?
It’s always a good idea to ask the right question. In this case , let’s ask who is better off after nationalisation, compared to a private sector solution, and who is worse off? Who is taking what risks in each scenario? The private sector options were that shareholders and/or new investors would put in more cash - at least £700m. The Government would receive a punitive interest rate on the Bank of England loan, an upfront arrangement fee of £200m (maybe more) and a later share in profits of a similar amount (the amount of this the Gov’t wanted was the deal-breaker). Conditions would presumably include no dividends until after the Bank’s loan is paid and Gov’t oversight of the business at least until then to prevent any undue risk-taking. In other words NR would be run in a similar way whether it was nationalised or not.
There are actually 4 cases to consider: nationalisation and continued private ownership on one axis and making money and losing money on the other.
If the nationalised bank loses money the taxpayer will lose the full amount lost, if it makes money the taxpayer will gain the full amount gained. Presumably Gordo is happy to take this risk, which implies he wouldn’t have been taking a huge risk had he allowed the private sector solution. Oh, what tangled webs we weave… But let’s go on.
I must have missed a small detail. Aha! Here it is. After nationalisation the taxpayer may have confiscated all the shareholders’ funds. Let’s say these are worth £2bn (about £4 a share). If it does manage this, the taxpayer will only lose out if the bank loses more than £2bn. If legal action goes against the Gov’t, though, (and I so hope it does!), the shareholders will get their £2bn back and the taxpayer will be carrying all the risk. I hope you’re happy with that, Mr Indignant. Nationalisation only makes sense, it seems, if the Government is able to expropriate shareholders’ funds. Hmm. But let’s just check that conclusion by looking at the counterfactual set of possibilities.
If the bank had remained private, though, and lost money, the shareholders would lose out first. Let’s say the shareholders put in £700m now and another £800m as the mortgage market worsens over the next couple of years. They already have £2bn, we’re assuming. The bank would have to lose £3.5bn before the taxpayer loses out. Hmm, do you suppose the taxpayer is taking more risk, or less, than if the bank is nationalised?
What if the bank makes money as a private entity? Well, the shareholders would make a profit, but only after they’ve paid to the “taxpayer”:
- say 3 years times 1% above market rate on a loan of £25bn, which comes to £750m;*
- an estimated £200m arrangement fee;
- another £200m from profits.
That is, well over £1bn. [*Postscript 23/2/08: Oops. Actually, I’ve seriously overstated the case. The arrangement fee was for converting the debt to bonds to be sold a commercial rate, and putting a Gov’t guarantee on them. At this point, punitive interest would no longer be payable on the debt. But the basic point stands - the taxpayer would have got a few hundred mill under the private sector solution, which it won’t receive now it’s nationalised the bank].
So the “taxpayer” is taking a lot more risk by nationalising the bank than not, but may potentially make more profit, as long as it isn’t tripped up by the “independent” valuer or in subsequent court cases.
These are the two assumptions underlying the Gov’t’s decision to nationalise Northern Rock:
- They’re with Larry when he says that: “The bank has a good mortgage book and, given the tendency of house prices in Britain to rise, there is no reason why the taxpayer should lose out.” i.e. they think it’s unlikely they’ll be in that loss-making scenario.
- They believe they’ll get the shares in the bank for nothing, or virtually nothing.
Now, I think these two assumptions are actually incompatible. By the time legal avenues are exhausted, the courts will know whether the bank is going to lose or make money in the longer term, and therefore whether the shareholders’ assets were worth anything.
With a bit of luck the courts may also judge that a large part of NR’s predicament has been caused by Gov’t bungling - they should have put liquidity into the markets before NR failed, etc. (bit of a litany, here). The Government is attempting to confiscate assets, pure and simple. Perhaps this is the sort of world Hutton and Elliott want to see. See you in Hell, boys!
There are 2 other reasons why the Government has gone for nationalisation:
- populism, since they’ve done nothing to dispel the popular notion that the taxpayer is actually spending money “that could be used to pay for hospitals”, etc.
- control: Brown is a control freak and when it comes to the crunch he wants to keep his cards where he can see them. He’s terrified by the thought of being a hostage to fortunes at Northern Rock in the run-up to the next election. This way, he can put any bad news off until he’s gone to the polls.
Before I finish, I ask myself why else should NR’s shareholders’ have “an extraordinary sense of entitlement” as Will puts it? Well, Will, perhaps it’s because everyone else is exhibiting “an extraordinary sense of entitlement”. Let’s forgive “the taxpayer” who is being kept in a state of appalling ignorance. What about the depositors in NR, whose panic is one of the causes of the present imbroglio? They lent people money to buy houses and then suddenly decided en masse to call in the loan. Nice. The depositors who put their personal interest above that of the bank and the community that rely on it, and above the fellow depositors behind them in the queue, were at the time entitled to £2,000 and then 90% up to £35,000 if the bank ran out of money before they got to the front of the queue. “ffs didn’t they know the risks they deserve nothing more”, to quote (adapted) some graffiti on a Downing Street petition. But, of course, the depositors are Darling’s darlings and the rules can be changed overnight, so that these people don’t have to worry about anyone other than themselves. Just take all your money out, says Darling, don’t worry about everyone else! It’s a wonderful life for some, isn’t it! Will, perhaps you can explain, so we’re all clear, whether this the sort of support for self-interested behaviour is the kind of “public interaction” you’d like to see more of?
Here’s a disaster scenario “Dangerous” Darling is leading us into, in his desire to pander to the public. He’s now going to get the “taxpayer” to guarantee all deposits in the UK, up to say £100,000. So, you and I may as well take the highest interest rate we can find anywhere. Don’t worry about whether the bank might go bust! And he’s encouraging banks and building societies to offer 25 year mortgages, so Mr Diddums doesn’t need to worry so much about his £200,000 mortgage. Oh, and I nearly forgot, funding from retail deposits is doubleplusgood, funding from international capital markets is doubleplusungood. Let’s roll on to say 2020, and house prices have been kept up by Darling’s new babies, those jolly reassuring 25 year fixed rate mortgages! (Because that’s what it’s all about, really - the electorate will not easily forgive a Gov’t that they think has caused a drop in the value of their homes. Remember Major!). But back to the story. By 2020 inflation is rearing it’s head again, and, unlike in the “Panic of 2007-8″, it fails to recede. This time the world really is running out of oil and land to grow food on. The base rate climbs to 10% and keeps on going up. Retail interest rates reach 15%. House prices really do crash to something like the cost of building a house (which is where they should be in the long-run), and keep on going down… (supply and demand, you know). And all those building societies have made 25 year loans at 7%, but are having to compete by paying more than twice that for the cash they have lent… Depositors don’t care, they can just keep shopping around for the best rate for their AAA rated £100,000. So, paying out 15%, taking in 7.5%… What do you think is going to happen? Perhaps Mr Indignant, the taxpayer, will not remember his Darling quite so fondly when he has to pick up the tab for all those failing building societies.
Btw my little story is not entirely dissimilar to what happened during the Savings and Loans crisis in the US in the 1980s and 1990s (but with its causes back in the 1970s). It was a financial disaster that makes the Northern Rock fiasco seem like losing a fiver on the Grand National. And when it happens, what we’ll need are something like the romantically named Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the US.
But perhaps Will thinks this would all be a good thing. Perhaps in Will-world the public should take the risk for those lucky enough to have £10,000s in the building society and lucky enough to be able to take out a hefty 25 year mortgage. The bigger the mortgage, the more risk we’ll all take on on their behalf, eh, Will?

Mon 18 Feb 2008
Tropical cyclone history - part I: How reliable are past hurricane records?
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Guest Commentary from Urs Neu
When discussing the influence of anthropogenic global warming on hurricane or tropical cyclone (TC) frequency and intensity (see e.g. here, here, and here), it is important to examine observed past trends. As with all climate variables, the hurricane record becomes increasingly uncertain when we go back in time. However, the hurricane record has some peculiarities: hurricanes are highly confined structures, so you have to be at the right place at the right time to observe them. Secondly, hurricanes spend most of their life in the open oceans, i.e. in regions where there are very few people and no fixed observations. This means that the reliability of the long-term hurricane record is dependent on who was measuring them, and how, at any given time. The implementation of new observation methods, for example, might have altered the quality of the record considerably. But how much? This crucial question has been widely discussed in the recent scientific literature (e.g. Chang and Guo 2007, Holland and Webster 2007, Kossin et al. 2007, Landsea 2007, Mann et al. 2007). Where do we stand at the moment? This post will concentrate on the North Atlantic, which has the longest record.
The official Atlantic hurricane record provided by the U.S. National Hurricane Center (HURDAT) represents the reference data base for most of the studies and contains all observed TCs, their individual tracks and intensity. The record has been extended back to 1850, and the earlier periods (until 1914) have been re-analysed in recent years. Reanalysis work continues, and updates and corrections are regularly reported.
This record contains two important abrupt inhomogeneities. The introduction of air reconnaissance flights in 1944 and the launch of the first geostationary satellite ATS-I in December 1966 mark two important improvements of measurement facilities and thus the observational coverage of the area under examination. Landsea (2007) claims a third one in 2002, since the new advanced microwave sounding unit (Quikscat) has lead to the retrospective detection of additional tropical cyclones in the last few years. Some also argue for placing the start of the satellite area later, in the mid-1970s relying on the launch of the GEOS-satellites. Furthermore, there are some changes in ship track patterns after 1914 with the opening of the Panama Canal and during the two world wars.
In addition, there are also a number of gradual observational improvements over time, e.g. the increasing quality of satellite images, or in earlier times the increase of the number of ship tracks or the growing population density on the coastlines, both of which enhance the probability that a TC would have been observed. And last but not least, there might be inhomogeneities due to the subjective component in the classification of tropical storms (the so-called Dvorak method, Dvorak 1984) which might lead to systematic differences between different forecasters. However, the homogeneous reanalysis of the last 23 years has shown that this subjectivity and improved observations has not lead to a noticeable alteration of the long-term trend for Atlantic storms (Kossin et al. 2007).
Climate change impacts on hurricanes generally focus on two key quantities, the frequency and intensity of storms. There is no reason to believe that both quantities will change similarly. In the discussion of past activity, the frequency is described by the number of tropical storms that occur annually in each basin. The maximum intensity (or even more complex metrics such as the Power Dissipation Index which integrates intensity over space and time; Emanuel 2005) is harder to measure, because it requires detailed information about the storm along the storm track over its entire lifetime. Therefore most discussions of historical trends have focused on tropical storm frequency/number or in some cases the number of intense storms (e.g. the number of major hurricanes).
Thus the key question is: how many storms did we miss in the past? Recently there have been a number of attempts to estimate this ‘undercount bias’ in the tropical storm record. These attempts have included:
- reconstruction of the observational bias by relating past observation density (e.g. ship tracks) to modern storm tracks
- using the relation between total TC number and better known subsets of the TC record (e.g. landfalling storms)
- using relationships of known underlying variables (e.g. relevant climate indices) to annual TC numbers to create a ‘predicted’ TC record, and compare it to the observed record.
All these approaches have a common caveat, namely the assumption that the relationships they rely upon are constant over time. The validity of this assumption therefore has to be examined in any studies using such approaches. Let us consider some recent such studies:
(1) Landsea [2007] performed a simple analysis to estimate the observational bias for the time from 1900 until the begin of the satellite period in 1966. He examined the percentage of tropical cyclones that struck land (PTL) and notices a considerable difference between the time periods 1900-1965 (pre-satellite period, PTL=75%) and 1966-2006 (PTL=59%). He suggests that this difference indicates an underestimation of about 2 tropical cyclones per year before 1965.
Unfortunately, Landsea does not discuss the evolution of PTL before 1900 (left side of the red dashed line in Figure 1). If PTL really is a proxy for underreporting due to decreasing observation density, PTL should further increase before 1900. However, there is a decrease. The period 1851-1899 has an average PTL of 67%, the period 1851-1885 even has an average PTL of 61%, which is not significantly different from the satellite period after 1966 (59%).
Figure 1. Percentage of all reported tropical storms, subtropical storms, and hurricanes that struck land 1851-2006. Extension of Fig. 2b in Landsea [2007].
Therefore it is questionable if PTL really is a reliable proxy of underreporting. One might argue, as Landsea implicitly does, that after 1900 the population density on the coasts and islands was high enough to catch all tropical cyclones, and the underreporting is only due to decreasing density of shipping tracks, while before 1900 also some tropical cyclones that struck land were missed. However, before 1900 not only population density but also shipping track density was lower and therefore PTL likely should be about at the same level as after 1900 but not significantly lower. In addition, Landsea contradicts that argument himself by stating that even in 2005 a retrospective analysis reveals that there was a tropical cyclone that made landfall in a sparsely populated area and was therefore not initially included as a landfalling storm.
Moreover, in another study (Holland, 2007) it has been shown, that the natural variability of TC numbers is different for different regions of the tropical Atlantic. Therefore, the proportion of TCs over the open sea also varies naturally, altering the landfall proportion for reasons unrelated to observation bias. Thus PTL seems not to be a good proxy for observational biases. The study showed that the decrease in PTL in the 1960s is mainly due to a decrease of TC number in the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico. Since these regions are well observed by dense ship tracks and a number of islands, this decrease is very unlikely to be mainly an observational bias.
(2) Sticking to ship tracks, Chang and Guo (2007) performed a different type of analysis: They compared the ship tracks of the years before the satellite era with TC tracks of recent years. For example, they took the ship tracks of the year 1917 and overlaid the TC tracks of 1999 and determined how many of the 1999 tropical cyclones would have been observed if the ships had navigated as in 1917. By comparing the years before the satellite era to all the ‘satellite’ years (after 1965) they obtained statistics for how many TCs would likely have been missed in earlier years if the distribution of TC tracks had been similar to that during the satellite period. In this way they estimated a TC undercount of about 2 per year in the period 1903-1914, 1-2 per year 1915-1925 and of less than 1 per year from 1925-1965.
The adequacy of this estimation depends on several assumptions: a) that the distribution of the hurricane tracks is about the same in the satellite period than in the periods before. As we have seen before (Holland 2007), there are shifts in the regional distribution over the 20th century. This could influence the estimation of underreporting both in a positive or negative way; b) that all landfalling storms have been detected correctly. It is likely that some of the landfalling storms (or their true strength) might have been missed, which would bias the estimate artificially low; c) that ships did not circumnavigate the storms (e.g. on the basis of predictions). If this was the case, the undercount estimate might be too conservative; d) that ships measured wind correctly. Because this error is random, a significant systematic bias of the undercount estimate is unlikely; and e) that all ship tracks are recorded in the database used. There may have been other, unrecorded ship tracks, which might have detected a storm missed by known ship tracks. This would lead to an exaggerated undercount estimate. Altogether these assumptions likely tend to somewhat underestimate the undercount.
(3) In a third study (Mann et al. 2007; in full disclosure, I was a co-author of this paper), an alternative approach was used employing the statistical relationship between Atlantic TC numbers and three climate variables influencing Atlantic TC activity (1. August-October sea surface temperatures over the main development region (“MDR”); 2. the El Niño/Southern Oscillation, and 3. the North Atlantic Oscillation) during the modern period of reconnaissance flights and satellite observations (1944-2006). This relationship was then used to predict TC numbers for the period 1870-1943 as would be expected from the behavior of the three climate variables used over that period. These estimates were then compared to the observed TC record, the difference providing an estimate for the underreporting. The results yielded an undercount before 1944 of 1.2 TCs per year (best estimate), with a range of 0.5-2 TC per year.
This analysis also relies on several assumptions. Namely, that a) the underlying climate variables do not contain artificial trends or other inhomogeneities that might bias the results. That the results were insensitive to using different alternative SST datasets, or switching the role of training period and prediction period (i.e. training on 1870-1943 and predicting for 1944-2006) was taken, however, as evidence against this being a significant issue. b) that there are no long-term trends in other climate variables not included in the statistical model, but that do influence TC numbers (e.g. wind shear or vertical stability) or might influence the relationships between TC numbers and the variables that are used. Although such an influence cannot be excluded, cross-checks that were performed such as statistical validation and switching the order of training and prediction intervals, seem to argue against this being a problem.
In summary, according to current knowledge, the best estimate for the underreporting bias in the hurricane record seems to be about one tropical cyclone per year on average over the period 1920-1965 and between one and three tropical cyclones per year before 1920. With only a few years of data available, the influence of Quikscat analyses after 2002 as discussed by Landsea, is difficult to as yet meaningfully estimate.
References:
Chang, E. K. M., and Y. Guo (2007): Is the number of North Atlantic tropical cyclones significantly underestimated prior to the availability of satellite observations? Geophys. Res. Lett., 34, L14801, doi:10.1029/2007GL030169.
Holland, G. (2007): Misuse of landfall as a proxy for Atlantic tropical cyclone activity. Eos Trans. AGU, 88, 349.
Holland, G.J., and P.J. Webster (2007): Heightened tropical cyclone activity in the North Atlantic: natural variability or climate trend? Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Ser. A, 365, 2695– 2716, doi:10.1098/rsta.2007.2083.
Kossin, J. P., K. R. Knapp, D. J. Vimont, R. J. Murnane, B. A. Harper (2007): A globally consistent reanalysis of hurricane variability and trends. Geophys. Res. Lett., 34, L04815, doi:10.1029/2006GL028836.
Landsea, C. W. (2007), Counting Atlantic Tropical Cyclones Back to 1900. EOS, 18, 197-208.
Mann, M.E., T.A. Sabbatelli, U. Neu (2007): Evidence for a modest undercount bias in early historical Atlantic tropical cyclone counts. Geophys. Res. Lett., 34, L22707, doi:10.1029/2007GL031781.
Tue 12 Feb 2008
Guest commentary from Spencer Weart, science historian
Despite the recent announcement that the discharge from some Antarctic glaciers is accelerating, we often hear people remarking that parts of Antarctica are getting colder, and indeed the ice pack in the Southern Ocean around Antarctica has actually been getting bigger. Doesn’t this contradict the calculations that greenhouse gases are warming the globe? Not at all, because a cold Antarctica is just what calculations predict… and have predicted for the past quarter century.
It’s not just that Antarctica is covered with a gazillion tons of ice, although that certainly helps keep it cold. The ocean also plays a role, which is doubly important because of the way it has delayed the world’s recognition of global warming.
When the first rudimentary models of climate change were developed in the early 1970s, some modelers pointed out that as the increase of greenhouse gases added heat to the atmosphere, much of the energy would be absorbed into the upper layer of the oceans. While the water was warming up, the world’s perception of climate change would be delayed. Up to this point most calculations had started with a doubled CO2 level and figured out how the world’s temperature would look in equilibrium. But in the real world, when the rising level of gas reached that point the system would still be a long way from equilibrium. “We may not be given a warning until the CO2 loading is such that an appreciable climate change is inevitable,” a National Academy of Sciences panel warned in 1979.(1)
Modelers took a closer look and noticed some complications. As greenhouse gases increase, the heat seeps gradually deeper and deeper into the oceans. But when larger volumes of water are brought into play, they bring a larger heat capacity. Thus as the years passed, the atmospheric warming would increasingly lag behind what would happen if there were no oceans. In 1980 a New York University group reported that “the influence of deep sea thermal storage could delay the full value of temperature increment predicted by equilibrium models by 10 to 20 years” just between 1980 and 2000 A.D. (2)
The delay would not be the same everywhere. After all, the Southern Hemisphere is mostly ocean, whereas land occupies a good part of the Northern Hemisphere. A model constructed by Stephen Schneider and Thompson, highly simplified in modern terms but sophisticated for its time, suggested that the Southern Hemisphere would experience delays decades longer than the Northern. Schneider and Thompson warned that if people compared observations with what would be expected from a simple equilibrium model, “we may still be misled… in the decade A.D. 2000-2010.” (3)
The pioneer climate modelers Kirk Bryan and Syukuro Manabe took up the question with a more detailed model that revealed an additional effect. In the Southern Ocean around Antarctica the mixing of water went deeper than in Northern waters, so more volumes of water were brought into play earlier. In their model, around Antarctica “there is no warming at the sea surface, and even a slight cooling over the 50-year duration of the experiment.” (4) In the twenty years since, computer models have improved by orders of magnitude, but they continue to show that Antarctica cannot be expected to warm up very significantly until long after the rest of the world’s climate is radically changed.
Bottom line: A cold Antarctica and Southern Ocean do not contradict our models of global warming. For a long time the models have predicted just that.
(1) National Academy of Sciences, Climate Research Board (1979). Carbon Dioxide and Climate: A Scientific Assessment (Jule Charney, Chair). Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences.
(2) Martin I. Hoffert, et al. (1980) J. Geophysical Research 85: 6667-6679.
(3) Stephen H. Schneider and S.L. Thompson (1981) J. Geophysical Research 86: 3135-3147.
(4) Kirk Bryan et al. (1988). J. Physical Oceanography 18: 851-67. For the story overall see Syukuro Manabe and Ronald J. Stouffer (2007) Journal of the Meteorological Society of Japan 85B: 385-403.
Thu 7 Feb 2008
Government reports on biofuels talk about the “GHG savings” of biofuels made from particular crops (often referred to as biofuel “feedstocks”). This is fundamentally the wrong approach. In the attached paper, Biofuel Payback Periods (pdf), I present a method of assessing the worth of growing biofuel crops in terms of the potential of the land on which they are grown to store carbon if biofuels aren’t grown.
Just considering “GHG savings” is like comparing company profits without taking any account of the company’s size (e.g. the capital employed) - for example, £1m profits in a year might be a good performance for the local filling station but would be a disaster for, say, BP.

Thu 7 Feb 2008
I was honoured to be invited to the annual regional conference for Norwegian journalists, taking place annually in a small town called ‘Hell’ (Try Earth Google 'Hell, Norway'). During this conference, I was asked to participate in a panel debate about the theme: ‘Climate – how should we [the media] deal with world’s most pressing issue?’ (my translation from Norwegian; by the way 'Gods expedition' means 'Cargo shipment' in 'old' Norwegian dialect).
This is the first time that I have been invited to such a gathering, and probably the first time that a Norwegian journalists' conference invited a group of people to discuss the climate issue. My impression was that the journalists more or less now were convinced by the message of the IPCC assessment reports. This can also be seen in daily press news reports where contrarians figure less now than ~5 years ago. But the public seemed to think that the scientists cannot agree on the reality or cause of climate change.
I find that the revelation of a perception of the climate problem within the climate research community that doesn't match that of the general public problematic. What I learned is that this also seems to be true for the journalists: it was stated that their perception of climate change and its causes were different to the general public too.
The panel in which I participated consisted of a social/political scientist who had investigated how media deals with the issue of climate change and the public perception thereof, a science journalist, an AGW-skeptic, and myself. Despite the name of the place, the debate was fairly civil and well-behaved (although the AGW-skeptic compared climate scientists to mosquitoes, and brought up some ad hominem attacks on Dr. Pachauri).
The science journalist in the panel advocated the practice of reporting on issues that are based on publications from peer reviewed scientific literature. I whole-heartedly concur. I would also advice journalists to do some extensive search on the publication record of the individuals, and consider their affiliations – are they from a reputable place? Also, it’s recommended that they consider which journal in which the article is published – an article on climate published in the Journal of American Physicians and Surgeons is less likely to receive a review of competent experts (peers) than if it were published in a mainstream geophysics journal. Finally, my advice is to try to trace the argument back to its source - does it come from some of those think tanks? But I didn't get the chance to say this, as the debate was conducted by a moderator whose agenda was more focused on other questions.
Short of telling the journalists to start to read physics in order to understand the issues at hand, I recommended the reading of Spencer Weart’s ‘The Discovery of Global Warming’. The book is an easy read and gives a good background about the climate sciences. It also reveals that a number of arguments still forwarded by AGW-skeptics are quite old and have been answered over time. The book gives the impression of a déjà vu regarding the counter arguments, the worries, politics, and the perceived urgency of the problem. I would also strongly recommend the book for the AGW-skeptics.
One reservation I had regarding the discussion is being cut off when I get into the science and the details. I had the feeling of taking part in a football match where the referee and all the spectators were blind and then tried to convince them that I scored a goal. The problem is that people without scientific training often find it hard to judge who's right and who's wrong. It seems that communication skills are more important for convincing the general public that scientific skills. Scientists are usually not renowned for their ability to explain complicated and technical matters, but rather tend to shy off.
I’d suggest that journalists should try to attend the annual conferences such as the European (EMS) and American (AMS) meteorological societies. For learning what's happening within the research, mingling with scientists/meteorologists, and because these conferences have lot to offer media (e.g. media sessions). Just as journalists go to the Olympics, would it not be natural for journalists to attend these conferences? – but I missed the opportunity to make this suggestion.
Hell seems to be fairly dead on a Sunday afternoon. I almost caught a cold from the freezing wait for the train – although the temperature was barely -3C. This January ranked as the third warmest in Oslo, and I have started to acclimatise myself to all these mild winters (the mountain regions, however, have received an unusually large amount of snow). Our minister of finance was due to attend the meeting to talk about getting grief, but she didn't make it to Hell due to a snow storm and chaos at the air port (heavy amount of wet snow due to mild winter conditions).
Wed 6 Feb 2008
I realise that in my previous post I referred to a Guardian article “EU bid to freeze out patio heaters”. I hadn’t intended to give the Guardian the honour or the Google benefit of my link, as I’d noticed the following meaning-free statement:
“…the Energy Saving Trust says patio heaters use as much energy as a gas stove hob does in six months.”
Is that as much energy in a week, a day or an hour as the hob uses in 6 months? OK, maybe a few words got lost, but the fact that this sort of thing gets past the Guardian sub-editors so often suggests a culture of innumeracy. And, indeed, if we look closer [so unreliable are numbers in Guardian articles that I often just blip over them], we see that just 2 paragraphs earlier we’re told that:
“Government figures put [annual] emissions from all domestic patio heaters at 22,200 tonnes of carbon dioxide - 0.002% of the total [annual] UK carbon dioxide emissions.”
I’ve had to add the “annual”s for clarity - this sort of vital detail is left out so often in the Guardian I barely notice it any more.
Anyway, I think to myself, that doesn’t sound quite right. 0.002 is 1/500th, and we’re talking percentages, so it’s 1/500th of 1/100th of the whole. In other words, we need to multiply the 22,200 tonnes by 100 * 500, that is by 50,000, to get the “total [annual] UK carbon dioxide emissions”. This comes to 1.11 billion tonnes of CO2, about - in fact, suspiciously, almost exactly - twice the actual figure for UK annual emissions, according to DEFRA data. So the true figure is that about 0.004% of the UK’s annual CO2 emissions are attributable to patio heaters.
I should say that the Guardian is not alone in this particular error. The Independent has this to say on the topic:
“Government figures show that domestic patio heaters produce a total of 22,200 tonnes of carbon dioxide, which is 0.002 per cent of the total UK carbon dioxide emissions, while televisions produce 4.6 million tonnes of CO2 each year.”
A startlingly similar paragraph to the one in the Guardian, I think you’ll agree! I presume this error originated in a 3rd party source - perhaps a government statement, or maybe from someone with an interest in keeping the figure as low as possible - but the culture of innumeracy in the media allows such errors to slip through time and time again.
*** Rant alert ***
As a sociologist and sometime class warrior, I observe this systematic journalistic innumeracy and ask myself, cui bono? - who benefits? Well, since numeracy would be a desirable quality in a journalist, and the supply of journos far exceeds demand, why wouldn’t strict tests be used to select those permitted to enter the profession? This is the case for many other professions - or does anyone think innumerate doctors would be a good idea? Of course, a historical explanation is called for, but the result of this institutional characteristic is that meritocratic considerations are less important than - IMHO - they should be in controlling entry to the profession. And perhaps, I suggest, privilege is more important. Why do I say this? Well, a privileged background is likely to supply contacts which always help when trying to enter a profession where there are limited opportunities. Privilege also gives prospective journos the ability - and the confidence - to make financial sacrifices, which are necessary to gain a foothold in the profession. In other words, we end up having our opinions disproportionately shaped by the comfortable middle-class.
*** Rant over ***
The story goes on. “Eco soundings” in today’s Guardian notes that:
“No initiative from the European parliament has attracted quite so much attention as last week’s 592-26 vote in favour of phasing out patio heaters. The 26 opponents almost all came from the UK Independence Party… “
Incredible. It crossed my mind to drop our middle-class friends a letter. Surely, at least one of the 592 MEPs must have considered that this action might have unintended consequences? Clearly the European institutions are now so delirious at the thought of having a project that justifies their existence, that rational thought is starting to desert them entirely.
I found it so hard to believe that virtually none of our MEPs is able to separate in their minds what will happen if their policy is adopted, from what they would like to happen, that I wondered if in fact it was me who was mistaken (it wouldn’t be the first time). I started to wonder if Brussels was in fact thinking of banning (or trying to ban) outdoor heating rather than outdoor heaters. Will the practice be banned, or just the products? And of course, the numerous media reports by the BBC, the Guardian, the Times, the Telegraph all fail to provide sufficient clarity. I have to find what appears to be a definitive source, which clearly says:
“MEPs urged the Commission to establish timetables for the withdrawal from the market of all the least energy-efficient items of equipment, appliances and other energy-using products, such as patio heaters.“
How can it be so difficult for our news sources to get this point across clearly?
*** Rant alert ***
Our MEPs are clearly quite happy for landlords to use less efficient means - such as electric heaters - to heat their outdoor spaces, as long as it looks like they’re doing something. As usual, government measures to try to solve a problem risk being totally counter-productive. Because, of course, it’s not really about solving problems at all - it’s all about maintaining or increasing their own authority.
*** Rant over ***

Wed 6 Feb 2008
It’s back to the 80s! Bring on “Ashes to Ashes“! The British media are in a frenzy. The Eurocrats are once again trying to take away our hard-won freedoms! What were we fighting for at Dunkirk and the Battle of Britain? They’ll be telling us we can only have straight bananas next!
Yes, those EU parliamentarians are questioning the wisdom of heating the outdoors.
A more rational response would be to say “fair point mes frères” (as “If…” might put it) and consider what might be a sensible policy response.
Let’s cut to the chase. Government edicts have a nasty habit of creating unintended adverse consequences. Indeed, much of the UK’s use of patio heaters is blamed on the recent ban on smoking in indoor spaces. The stated objective was to reduce passive smoking, in particular by bar staff. I won’t argue with that but the Government’s mistake was (as usual) to go further and try to tell us all what to do. Restricting people’s rights (i.e. to smoke) where these impinge on the rights of others (i.e. to breathe clean air) is one thing, but going any further than that is unjustifiable. Politicians appear to be the last to realise that the world has changed: no longer do people accept the authority of government to moralise and control their behaviour. Government should just ensure order. But I digress. In this instance, it’s quite clear that indoor smoking rooms (separately ventilated and away from where drinks are served) should have been allowed. And I haven’t even yet mentioned the light pollution, noise pollution, (and outdoor smoke and pavement congestion) I have been subjected to since the ban.
Sometimes even the “unintended” part of the phrase “unintended consequences” is barely audible. The EU, for example, wants 20% renewable energy by 2020. This is supposed to help us towards reducing GHG emissions by 20% by 2020 (or something). Never mind that biofuels - which increase GHG emissions - count towards the 20% renewables, but nuclear power - which reduces GHG emissions - doesn’t. Methinks the devious hands of vested interests too easily steer the guiding hand of government (if you get the gist).
There will also be other - perhaps truly unintended - consequences because of contradictions between the 20% renewables target and the 20% GHG reduction targets. Choices have to be made. If we invest in renewables then maybe we’ll invest less in efficiency. CHP - avoiding transmission losses - would (presumably) not count towards the 20% renewables target. And, a gripe I’ve made before (there’ll be a link when I remember where): policies such as the ludicrously expensive feed-in tariffs (which make the British Renewables Obligation look positively rational) employed in Germany and elsewhere on the Continent have the effect of diverting the world’s limited supply of solar panels to Northern Europe and away from regions where they would actually generate more energy.
The question of the precise unintended consequences of a ban on the sale of patio heaters was at the back of my mind at the weekend when I was sitting in a semi-enclosed outdoor area - in a chilly Rotterdam, as it happens. When I got up to leave, I realised that, as well as a patio-heater, there was another heat source behind me. Yes, a wall-mounted electric heater.
Now, until our electricity supply is decarbonised it is much more efficient to generate heat by burning gas (for example) locally, than in a power-station in order to produce electricity to turn back into heat. Losses of heat at the power-station and power during transmission (etc.) make heating with electricity 2.3 times as bad for global warming than using gas patio heaters, according to this thoughtful article in The Register.
The Register article suggests that:
“…depending on usage, electric heaters could be more efficient than LPG ones. If the area to be heated isn’t actually going to be occupied for most of the day, then electricity is probably better…”
But now I recollect my return journey to the UK, on an also chilly Sunday morning last weekend. I was in the waiting room at Bishop’s Stortford for an extended period, marvelling at the comparison of the organised incompetence that is rail transport in the UK (the train I was waiting for was apparently delayed by both a broken rail and a defective train) compared to the miraculous am-I-really-awake efficiency of the Dutch railways. There was an electric heater on the waiting-room wall. The only problem was that it was operated by a timer-switch. It stayed on for 5 minutes or so. Amusingly, and typically, there was no sign advertising that the switch was intended for customer operation. It was only after sitting shivering for 15 minutes that - in a moment of mild insubordination - I pressed it to see what would happen. Was the device on the wall actually a heater and not an air-conditioner? Would it work? Would the station staff come running?
The heater helped, but not that much. I thought at the time that the waiting room might have been warm had the heater been on continuously for some hours. The point is that The Register overstates the case for the electric heater. Heat on continuously warms the whole of the air in a room, the furniture, the walls, the ceiling and the floor. Heat is a cumulative thing. Flashing back to the enclosed outdoor space in Rotterdam, then, if you took away the patio heater, but wanted your customers to feel just as warm, you would need to put in just as much heat with additional electric (or other) heaters as the patio heaters are supplying now.
The correct policy (as ever) is not micromanagement by government, but policies aimed purely at increasing the cost of producing GHGs. Millions of consumers and businesses will then make choices - in ways government is unable to predict - that result in reduced GHG emissions. The invisible hand of the market will be much more effective than the clumsy hand of government.

Mon 4 Feb 2008
In the lead up to the 4th Assessment Report, all the main climate modelling groups (17 of them at last count) made a series of coordinated simulations for the 20th Century and various scenarios for the future. All of this output is publicly available in the PCMDI IPCC AR4 archive (now officially called the CMIP3 archive, in recognition of the two previous, though less comprehensive, collections). We've mentioned this archive before in passing, but we've never really discussed what it is, how it came to be, how it is being used and how it is (or should be) radically transforming the comparisons of model output and observational data.
First off, it's important to note that this effort was not organised by IPCC itself. Instead, it was coordinated by the Working Group on Coupled Modelling (WGCM), an unpaid committee that is part of an alphabet soup of committees, nominally run by the WMO, that try to coordinate all aspects of climate-related research. In the lead up to AR4, WGCM took up the task of deciding what the key experiments would be, what would be requested from the modelling groups and how the data archive would be organised. This was highly non-trivial, and adjustments to the data requirements were still being made right up until the last minute. While this may seem arcane, or even boring, the point I'd like to leave is that just 'making data available' is the least of the problems in making data useful. There was a good summary of the process in Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society last month.
Previous efforts to coordinate model simulations had come up against two main barriers: getting the modelling groups to participate and making sure enough data was saved that useful work could be done.
Modelling groups tend to work in cycles. That is, there will be a period of a few years of development of a new model then a year or two of analysis and use of that model, until there is enough momentum and new ideas to upgrade the model and starting a new round of development. These cycles can be driven by purchasing policies for new computers, staff turnover, general enthusiasm, developmental delays etc. and until recently were unique to each modelling group. When new initiatives are announced (and they come roughly once every six months), the decision of the modelling group to participate depends on where they are in their cycle. If they are in the middle of the development phase, they will likely not want to use their last model (because the new one will almost certainly be better), but they might not be able to use the new one either because it just isn't ready. These phasing issues definitely impacted earlier attempts to produce model output archives.
What was different this time round is that the IPCC timetable has, after almost 20 years, managed to synchronise development cycles such that, with only a couple of notable exceptions, most groups were ready with their new models early in 2004 - which is when these simulations needed to start if the analysis was going to be available for the AR4 report being written in 2005/6. (It's interesting to compare this with nonlinear phase synchronisation in, for instance, fireflies).
The other big change this time around was the amount of data requested. The diagnostics in previous archives had been relatively sparse - the main atmospheric variables (temperature, precipitation, winds etc.) but not huge amounts extra, and generally only at monthly resolution. This had limited the usefulness of the previous archives because if something interesting was seen, it was almost impossible to diagnose why it had happened without having access to more information. This time, the diagnostic requests for the atmospheric, ocean, land and ice were much more extensive and a significant amount of high-frequency data was asked for as well (i.e. 6 hourly fields). For the first time, this meant that outsiders could really look at the 'weather' regimes of the climate models.
The work involved in these experiments was significant and unfunded. At GISS, the simulations took about a year to do. That includes a few partial do-overs to fix small problems (like an inadvertent mis-specification of the ozone depletion trend), the processing of the data, the transfer to PCMDI and the ongoing checking to make sure that the data was what it was supposed to be. The amount of data was so large - about a dozen different experiments, a few ensemble members for most experiments, large amounts of high-frequency data - that transferring it to PCMDI over the internet would have taken years. Thus, all the data was shipped on terabyte hard drives.
Once the data was available from all the modelling groups (all in consistent netcdf files with standardised names and formatting), a few groups were given some seed money from NSF/NOAA/NASA to get cracking on various important comparisons. However, the number of people who have registered to use the data (more than 1000) far exceeded the number of people who were actually being paid to look at it. Although some of the people who were looking at the data were from the modelling groups, the vast majority were from the wider academic community and for many it was the first time that they'd had direct access to raw GCM output.
With that influx of new talent, many innovative diagnostics were examined. Many, indeed, that hadn't been looked at by the modelling groups themselves, even internally. It is possibly under-appreciated that the number of possible model-data comparisons far exceeds the capacity of any one modelling center to examine them.
The advantages of the database is the ability to address a number of different kinds of uncertainty, not everything of course, but certainly more than was available before. Specifically, the uncertainty in distinguishing forced and unforced variability and the uncertainty due to model imperfections.
When comparing climate models to reality the first problem to confront is the 'weather', defined loosely as the unforced variability (that exists on multiple timescales). Any particular realisation of a climate model simulation, say of the 20th Century, will have a different sequence of weather - that is, the weather pattern on Jan 31, 1967 in one realisation will be uncorrelated to the weather pattern on Jan 31, 1967 in another realisation, even though each run has the same climate forcing (increases in greenhouse gases, volcanoes etc.). There is no expectation that the weather in any one model will be correlated to that in the real world either. So any comparison of climate models and data needs to estimate the amount of change that is due to the weather and the amount related to the forcing. In the real world, that is difficult because there is certainly a degree of unforced variability even at decadal scales (and possibly longer). However, in the model archive it is relatively easy to distinguish.
The standard trick is to look at the ensemble of model runs. If each run has different, uncorrelated weather, then averaging over the different simulations (the ensemble mean) gives an estimate of the underlying forced change. Normally this is done for one single model and for metrics like the global mean temperature, only a few ensemble members are needed to reduce the noise. For other metrics - like regional diagnostics - more ensemble members are required. There is another standard way to reduce weather noise, and that is to average over time, or over specific events. If you are interested in the impact of volcanic eruptions, it is basically equivalent to run the same eruption 20 times with different starting points, or collect together the response of 20 different eruptions. The same can be done with the response to El Niño for instance.
With the new archive though, people have tried something new - averaging the results of all the different models. This is termed a meta-ensemble, and at first thought it doesn't seem very sensible. Unlike the weather noise, the difference between models is not drawn from a nicely behaved distribution, the models are not independent in any solidly statistical sense, and no-one really thinks they are all equally valid. Thus many of the pre-requisites for making this mathematically sound are missing, or at best, unquantified. Expectations from a meta-ensemble are therefore low. But, and this is a curious thing, it turns out that the meta-ensemble of all the IPCC simulations actually outperforms any single model when compared to the real world. That implies that at least some part of the model differences is in fact random and can be cancelled out. Of course, many systematic problems remain even in a meta-ensemble.
There are lots of ongoing attempts to refine this. What happens if you try and exclude some models that don't pass an initial screening? Can you weight the models in an optimum way to improve forecasts? Unfortunately, there doesn't seem to be any universal way to do this despite a few successful attempts. More research on this question is definitely needed.
Note however that the ensemble or meta-ensemble only gives a measure of the central tendency or forced component. They do not help answer the question of whether the models are consistent with any observed change. For that, one needs to look at the spread of the model simulations, noting that each simulation is a potential realisation of the underlying assumptions in the models. Do not - for instance, confuse the uncertainty in the estimate of the ensemble mean with the spread!
Particularly important simulations for model-data comparisons are the forced coupled-model runs for the 20th Century, and 'AMIP'-style runs for the late 20th Century. 'AMIP' runs are atmospheric model runs that impose the observed sea surface temperature conditions instead of calculating them with an ocean model, optionally using other forcings as well and are particularly useful if it matters that you get the timing and amplitude of El Niño correct in a comparison. No more need the question be asked 'what do the models say?' - you can ask them directly.
The usefulness of any comparison is whether it really provides a constraint on the models and there are plenty of good examples of this. What is ideal are diagnostics that are robust in the models, not too affected by weather, and can be estimated in the real world e.g Ben Santer's paper on tropospheric trends, the discussion we had on global dimming trends, and the AR4 report is full of more examples. What isn't useful are short period and/or limited area diagnostics for which the ensemble spread is enormous.
CMIP3 2.0?
In such a large endeavor, it's inevitable that not everything is done to everyone's satisfaction and that in hindsight some opportunities were missed. The following items should therefore be read as suggestions for next time around, and not as criticisms of the organisation this time.
Initially the model output was only accessible to people who had registered and had a specific proposal to study the data. While this makes some sense in discouraging needless duplication of effort, it isn't necessary and discourages the kind of casual browsing that is useful for getting a feel for the output or spotting something unexpected. However, the archive will soon be available with no restrictions and hopefully that setup can be maintained for other archives in future.
Another issue with access is the sheer amount amount of data and the relative slowness of downloading data over the internet. Here some lessons could be taken from more popular high-bandwidth applications. Reducing time-to-download for videos or music has relied on distributed access to the data. Applications like BitTorrent manage download speeds that are hugely faster than direct downloads because you end up getting data from dozens of locations at the same time, from people who'd downloaded the same thing as you. Therefore the more popular an item, the quicker it is to download. There is much that could be learned from this data model.
The other way to reduce download times is to make sure that you only download what is wanted. If you only want a time series of global mean temperatures, you shouldn't need to download the two-dimensional field and create your own averages. Thus for many purposes, automatic global, zonal-mean or vertical averaging would have saved an enormous amount of time.
Finally, the essence of the Web 2.0 movement is interactivity - consumers can also be producers. In the current CMIP3 setup, the modelling groups are the producers but the return flow of information is rather limited. People who analyse the data have published many interesting papers (over 380 and counting) but their analyses have not been 'mainstreamed' into model development efforts. For instance, there is a great paper by Lin et al on tropical intra-seasonal variability (such as the Madden-Julian Oscillation) in the models. Their analysis was quite complex and would be a useful addition to the suite of diagnostics regularly tested in model development, but it is impractical to expect Dr. Lin to just redo his analysis every time the models change. A better model would be for the archive to host the analysis scripts as well so that they could be accessed as easily as the data. There are of course issues of citation with such an idea, but it needn't be insuperable. In a similar way, how many times did different people calculate the NAO or Niño 3.4 indices in the models? Having some organised user-generated content could have saved a lot of time there.
Maybe some of these ideas (and any others readers might care to suggest), could even be tried out relatively soon…
Conclusion
The diagnoses of the archive done so far are really only the tip of the iceberg compared to what could be done and it is very likely that the archive will be providing an invaluable resource for researchers for years. It is beyond question that the organisers deserve a great deal of gratitude from the community for having spearheaded this.
Sat 2 Feb 2008
Fri 1 Feb 2008
The Cambridge Climate Coalition, in conjunction with the UK Student Climate Project, will host a one day conference “Climate Change – What Next?” on Saturday, February 16, 2008 in Cambridge (see calendar and the conference page for details)
The objective of the conference is to assemble a large group of students with a broad spectrum of interests in climate change, from student activists to sceptics, economists to environmentalists. We seek to draw those students who have never previously attended these types of talks. The second objective is to ensure more long-term involvement of conference participants in projects around climate change. The goal is to be as inclusive as possible, and participants will include students from Cambridge and other universities involved in the UK Student Climate Project, as well as researchers and professors.
The conference consists of two parts. The first is dedicated to information sharing and the second to participation in and development of different student projects. In the morning, participants will attend informational sessions on a number of different and perhaps somewhat neglected climate change topics. These include (1) Psychology, Identity & Media, (2) Economics, (3) International Relations & the United Nations, (4) Business & Technology, (5) Science, (6) Development, (7) Individual Action & Travel, and (8) Theatre, Political Activism & Arts. The session speakers are experts in their field with extensive research or policy experience. Four sessions will run in parallel, so the total of eight sessions take up two 50 minute time blocks. The session speaker will present for 25 minutes, followed by 25 minutes for questions and answers. Participants in each informational session will select two students to present the main findings at the plenary.
In the afternoon, participants will have the opportunity to attend and play a more active role in workshops that present and develop different projects, such as a student carbon emissions trading scheme and a documentary on climate change. The evening will round off the event with dinner and chill out at the new Cambridge Cafe Project.
This event is going to be the first stop of the Student Climate Project University Tour, which is going around the whole of the UK to bring climate change issues to the students, and their ideas into the arena of national politics.
